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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 06-1058
                      
CHARLTON EARLE JENNINGS
v.
OFFICER LES FETTERMAN, In his official capacity; 
OFFICER TERRY DAWLEY; 
ERIE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE; 
D.A. BRAD FOULK; EX-EPD, 
CHIEF PAUL DEDIONISIO; ERIE POLICE DEPARTMENT
(WD/PA Civil No. 02-cv-00195)
                    
CHARLTON EARLE JENNINGS
 v.
OFFICER TERRY DAWLEY
(WD/PA Civil No. 02-cv-00196)
                    
CHARLTON EARLE JENNINGS
         v.
ERIE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE;
D.A. BRAD FOULK; ERIE POLICE DEPARTMENT
(WD/PA Civil No. 02-cv-00210)
Charlton E. Jennings,
                 Appellant
                                           
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(DC Civil. Nos. 02-cv-00195E, 02-cv-00196E, and 02-cv-00210E)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill
                                           
2Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and GREENBERG,  Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  August 15, 2006)
                                    
 OPINION OF THE COURT
___________________
PER CURIAM
Charlton Earle Jennings appeals from the judgment of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights actions filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We briefly summarize the events underlying Jennings’
claims, as they bear on our discussion.  Erie police stopped Jennings on the evening of
July 7, 2000, because his car’s taillights were not working.  Jennings provided a false
name when asked for identification, and when the name was run through a police
computer check, a flag for a suspended driver’s license was discovered.  After getting out
of the car upon the officers’ request, Jennings immediately fled and was pursued by one
of the officers.  In the course of the chase, Jennings managed to steal the officer’s
revolver, shoot him in the leg, and continue running.  Additional officers were called
upon to assist in the search for Jennings, including Defendant Terry Dawley who had
been off-duty.  After over two hours of searching, Dawley and another officer found
Jennings.  A gun battle ensued, resulting in both Dawley and Jennings receiving five
gunshot wounds and a second officer’s finger being shot off.  After Jennings had fallen to
the ground, Officer Les Fetterman jumped on his back and struggled to handcuff him. 
Fetterman eventually succeeded in this endeavor, after hitting and kicking Jennings in the
1Jennings originally filed five lawsuits naming 23 defendants.  Two of these suits
were previously dismissed.
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head, ribs, and groin.  Jennings was arrested and charged with numerous offenses.  An
Erie County jury convicted Jennings of nearly all of the charges, including the attempted
homicide of Dawley, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, theft of the revolver, and
resisting arrest.  Jennings’ convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. 
In 2002, Jennings filed three lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his
constitutional rights had been violated by Defendants’ actions in the course of his arrest.1 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss Jennings’ complaints under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) were variously granted in part, denied in part, or denied in their
entirety by the District Court.  Defendants Fetterman and Dawley then filed motions for
summary judgment, to which Jennings responded.  The District Court granted
Fetterman’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied Dawley’s summary
judgment motion in its entirety.  The District Court then consolidated the cases for trial,
ordered the parties to file pretrial statements, and scheduled a pretrial conference.  In their
pretrial statements, Defendants repeated arguments raised in earlier motions.  The court
construed these arguments as a motion for reconsideration of its previous orders and
proceeded to review and dismiss each of Jennings’ claims.  Jennings timely appealed.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the
District Court’s summary judgment dismissal of Jennings’ claims de novo, viewing the
underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
Jennings.  See Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1995).
Jennings alleged that Dawley used excessive force by shooting at him while under
4the influence of alcohol and that Fetterman violated his civil rights by calling Dawley to
return to duty even though he knew that Dawley was intoxicated.  The District Court
determined that these claims were barred as a matter of law by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994).  Under Heck, if a favorable judgment on a § 1983 damages claim would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, the claim must
be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.  To succeed on his excessive
force claim, Jennings must show that Dawley’s shooting at him was unreasonable in light
of the circumstances.  See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-77 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).  The District Court reasoned that
Jennings’ attempted homicide conviction necessarily meant that the jury had rejected
Jennings’ theory that he had shot at Dawley in self defense.  The court further explained
that a judgment in favor of Jennings on his excessive force claim would contradict this
jury finding and, by logical extension, invalidate the attempted homicide conviction.  As
Jennings did not demonstrate that this conviction had already been invalidated, we agree
with the District Court that Jennings’ claims were barred under Heck.  
Jennings next asserts that the Erie Police Department and former police chief Paul
DeDionisio deliberately delayed obtaining medical treatment for him for two hours after
the gun battle ended.  As an arrestee in the custody of government officials, Jennings was
required to be given medical care for his wounds.  See Monmouth County Corr.
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 n.31 (3d Cir. 1987).  Denial or delay
of such care can constitute “deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,” as
2This appeal was originally listed for possible dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 
Given the extent of the proceedings in the District Court, we find that summary
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proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See id. at 346-47.  The District
Court held that the record evidence showed that Jennings was medically treated at the
scene for his injuries, initially by a firefighter whom Fetterman had asked to tend to
Jennings, and later by a second ambulance which had been called.  As Jennings provided
no contradictory evidence, we agree with the District Court that there were no facts
demonstrating a “genuine issue for trial” on the issue of deliberate indifference and that
both defendants were entitled to summary judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Jennings contends that District Attorney Brad Foulk directed the police department
not to conduct an internal review of the events leading up to his arrest so that Jennings
would be deprived of information beneficial to his defense.  We agree with the District
Court’s dismissal of this claim, given the state courts’ uncontradicted findings that the
purpose of any internal police review would have been to determine whether the police
had received enough help in capturing Jennings, not whether there had been any police
misconduct.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 11.
Jennings’ final claim is that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
ordering the surgical removal of a bullet from his body without his consent.  As the
District Court observed, the record shows that Jennings himself sought a court order to
have bullets removed from his body due to the pain they were causing.  Therefore, there
is no factual basis for finding the surgery “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. 
See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal.2 
affirmance under LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 is a more appropriate method of disposing of
this appeal.
6
Appellant’s motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.
